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Impressions of Canadian Psychiatry
One of the problems in which all our Associations have a great interest is the future pattern of care to be provided within the mental health services. In the course of recent visits to western Canada I have been privileged to see something of the contribution being made in this field by Canadian psychiatrists. It was an invigorating experience because experiments in the provision of different patterns of care are being undertaken on an ambitious scale. The innovation and energy displayed, the capacity to translate theory into practice with swift and determined action, and the boldness and courage of a number of the programs provided a memorable experience.
In some of the provinces I visited, fostercare programs for chronic patients have been carried into effect. This is a timehonoured practice. But here it has received a modern interpretation with that concern for the dignity and independence of patients which we have come to regard as indispensable for contemporary mental health services. In some provinces the psychiatric departments of general hospitals are becoming the main vehicles through which psychiatric care is being delivered to the community, and the population of mental hospitals has been markedly reduced in size. Continuity of care is being maintained by a large and well-organized service of social workers and nurses who have their base within the department of psychiatry. The department thus acquires new vistas of community life and strengthens bonds with the population it serves.
These steps have been taken with remarkable speed and their effect potentiated by new or renovated departments of psychiatry, and in one case a quite new medical school -all established at what is for us a breath-bereaving pace.
The continuity of care emerging in modern Canadian practice is enviable and admirable. Such experiments are of fateful significance for psychiatrists the world over, for they will affect the mode of life of those suffering from psychiatric disorders and emotional disturbances, perhaps over the next century.
Evaluations and comparisons as precise and rigorous as the situation permits ought to be mounted so that all the lessons can be extracted from these important experiments.
Psychiatry and Antipsychiatry
It is ironic but not unexpected that, at a time when psychiatry is moving out of isolation and into closer proximity with other disciplines in general hospitals, the relationship of psychiatry with medicine should be called into question. The antimedical critique of psychiatry represents one approach within a wider movement which has assumed international proportions and adopts a critical or derogatory stance towards psychiatry's methods, aims and social role; it is antimedical, antitherapeutic, anti-institutional, anti-establishment and antiscientific, either by expressed aim or implicitly through the dogmatic, hortatory, diffuse and inconsistent character of its utterances.
The movement has fostered some improbable alliances between groups of sociologists, psychologists, psychoanalysts and Marxist critics of contemporary Western Society, such as Marcuse. Similar groupings have formed in many countries and the writings of the most articulate spokesmen, Szasz (in the United States), Laing and Cooper (in Great Britain) and Basaglia (in Italy) have, through the popularity of their books, reached a mass public. The denunciation of 'Sin' is prone to arrest attention.
The criticisms vary in content and emphasis. There is a general belief that the practice of psychiatry constitutes a "more or less greater threat to freedom. Some groups are unable to detect any distinction between the problems of psychiatric patients and those of oppressed and underprivileged minorities in society, and they urge psychiatrists to devote their energies to political affairs.
There is a group of eminent social scientists who have argued persuasively in favour of a contrary development that would halt the expansion of psychiatry. In the view of spokesmen such as Warren Dunham and Barbara Wootton, the widening of the range of maladjustments and miseries of mankind, which in recent years psychiatrists have come to regard as their proper concern, constitutes a threat to freedom of dissent. But Baroness Wootton has also at times appeared to say that it provides licences and alibis for social irresponsibility and misdemeanour.
This aspect of the controversy raises difficult issues. Psychiatric observations provide a source of novel, testable, and therefore potentially fruitful hypotheses concerning patterns of human behaviour outside the psychiatric clinic. For example, there are psychiatric approaches to the problems of crime and violence which may ultimately prove to be both illuminating and practically useful. But the premature and indiscriminate application of concepts (fashioned in a clinical setting) to human miseries and ills without limit is likely to prove self-defeating and pernicious. It is for this reason that the experienced psychiatrist, while remaining aware of the affinities, shows a scrupulous regard for the differences between illness, personality disorder and emotional responses which fall within the normal span of variation. He curbs his tendency to diagnose 'sickness' and to confer the role of 'patient'.
The anti psychiatrist scorns such distinctions. This refusal to discriminate has interesting implications. Schizophrenic, suicidally-depressed and obsessional patients are not ill because their behaviour stems from the same causes which determine the conduct of their fellow citizens. Clinics and psychiatric institutions are disguised expressions of the coercion practised by the ruling establishment upon all oppressed people. The therapy used by psychiatrists merely keeps some of the more troublesome political undesirables under control. Szasz says that the psychiatrist is not the doctor he pretends to be but is the symptom of a social disease. There is no illness because we are all engulfed by a social malady which debases and distorts human relationships. Nor are there any patients; we are all victims. No clinics or treatments are required because society is the real patient and it requires treatment of a radical kind.
Thus the abolition of psychiatry, as urged by the most prominent spokesmen of antipsychiatry, entails a paradoxical, pretentious and unacceptable extrapolation of the scope of psychiatric concepts. Antipsychiatry and the 'psychiatrization' of all mankind's ills are opposite sides of the same coin.
The clinical psychiatrist would reply that theories which deny psychiatry's affinities with medicine repudiate, with dogmatic assertions, evidence patiently gathered over the centuries about the disorders with which he is daily confronted. The humanity in whose name it is pronounced appears to offer no alternative remedies for the suffering individuals who seek his help.
There is no intention here to undertake a comprehensive critique of this wide-ranging debate. Certain questions are of special relevance in the present context. The view that psychiatric practice serves to blur moral issues and to disguise social and personal problems by reifying them as diseases is a central theme common to many antipsychiatric statements and will be considered in the following section.
Psychiatry, Morality and Determinism
One group of critics holds that through the activities and writings of psychiatrists, moral, social and legal problems are increasingly being converted into medical ones. The concept of illness is progressively encroaching on the concept of morality, and the notion of sin is increasingly giving way to the diagnosis of sickness. The right of the normal person to make moral judgements is usurped. Among other things it is asserted that psychiatrists have, through their concept of illness, encouraged a cult of irresponsibility and have provided criminals, delinquents and the generality of men (1'homme moyen sensuel) with an alibi for misconduct. For example, Thomas Szasz avers that the man who describes himself as Jesus Christ or as Napoleon is a liar rather than a patient. Any mis-346 CANADIAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION JOURNAL Vol. 17, No.5 demeanour committed by such a person should be dealt with legally rather than medically. Such an extreme statement could perhaps be ignored as manifestly absurd. Yet it partly reflects a wide body of opinion which is tilting not only at the concept of sickness but at the whole of the philosophy which seeks for causes of psychiatric disorders and must, as with all scientific quests, make the assumption that there are determining factors which ultimately should prove capable of definition and control.
Now a deterministic approach raises difficult philosophical questions, but that it is indispensable for any scientific attempt to solve problems can hardly be doubted. The attack is therefore upon the place of science, and ultimately upon the place of reason in the investigation of the phenomena with which psychiatry deals.
Psychiatrists have, in common with other scientists and philosophers, sought to reconcile science (which has to use deterministic concepts of causation) with the inner experience of free will and with the pragmatic needs of the human predicament; human society is viable only if people can in ordinary life hold each other responsible for their actions. Yet we know that individuals and even communities are frequently impelled by forces they do not understand to destroy all they claim to value consciously. It is mischievous and illogical to suggest that psychiatrists engender social irresponsibility by their attempts to dissect such behaviour. To the extent that they can discover determining factors of such phenomena -as they have done, for example, by depicting the medical and social profile of those who commit suicide -they can widen rather than restrict freedom of action.
Freedom expands through knowledge of necessity. The progress of science and of enlightenment can be tra-ced as a development from a stage in which moralistic and transcendental .attitudes were predominant to one in· which rational and deterministic explanations of phenomena have come to be accepted.
It is not so long since people suffering from schizophrenia were thrown into prison, those who attempted suicide were punished, women suffering from puerperal depression who injured their children were tried for murder, and those with dementia were burned at the stake as witches. In many parts of the world drug addicts are still treated as criminals.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century children were hanged for theft and only one hundred and fifty years ago slavery was justified by an appeal to the Scriptures. The repressive views of tyrannical monarchs were regarded as part of the moral order. Galileo's obscurantist inquisitors regarded his theories as impious and profane. The progress of science has been achieved through the substitution of rational concepts for beliefs enforced with moral sanctions, demanding acts we now repudiate with repugnance. The advance of psychiatry has conformed to this pattern. This is the old antinomy of deterministic causation, an indispensable assumption for science versus free will -a dead horse flogged for centuries by historians, philosophers and physicists. Albert Einstein believed to the end of his days that God did not play dice with the universe -but Einstein did not treat himself or others as clockwork toys or puppets whose acts had been wholly predetermined.
Among historians it has been asserted that those who try to explain historical events in causal (economic and social) terms are denying the existence of free will and fail in their duty to express moral condemnation of the Napoleons and Hitlers. One historian has provided a neat solution for history by dissociating technical history which looks for causes from God's history which expresses moral condemnation or praise. The latter is perhaps better reserved for Sundays, and psychiatrists and those interested in emotional disturbance could emulate this by seeking causes on working days and venting their moral censure when off duty.
Increasingly, we have come to replace the question 'Who is to blame?' with 'What determining factors can be defined?' And the question as to which punishment fits the crime before us has given way to enquiries as to how the person in question can be restored to social functioning. On the whole this has made for greater humanity and greater efficiency. Such knowledge has also tended to define more sharply where the proper sphere of moral choices lies. In other words we have for practical purposes to tolerate a certain amount of philosophical untidiness which accommodates both deterministic science and scope for free will. For man is always more than what he knows about himself and will perhaps always be.
The New Social Determinism
After the deterministic view implied by 'illness' has been expelled it is not altogether surprising to find it returning in a new guise. 'Illness' was an unacceptable description for phenomena such as schizophrenia, obsessive neurosis and depression, both because all such terms distort by reifying social interactions and because they threaten to undermine the sense of moral responsibility which societies must expect from their members. However, the alternative theories of social causation advanced are equally deterministic in character. One critic contends that psychiatrists have located the sickness in the wrong place; it is the corrupt values of society which should be the object of concern. An existential psychiatrist attributes schizophrenia to the violence perpetrated by society on the individual. The clinical picture has been invented by a coercive society for the purpose of labelling the patient, and his confinement in hospital is part of a planned process of degradation. The family is depicted as a main agent in this process. In another version schizophrenia is considered to be a voyage of self-discovery which should be allowed to proceed uninterrupted to achieve its beneficent effects.
There are several points to be made about views of this nature.
In problems of this complexity one has the right to expect that theories should be backed by evidence. Instead we are presented with isolated anecdotes and illustrative examples of a kind which can readily be found to buttress any view, no matter how false and irrational. Such dogmatic assertions tend to become the enemy of a rational, constructive approach to problems.
As the assertions concerning the nature of mental disorder are made in a form invulnerable to critical tests, they appear to have little substance. Inculpating society or the family tells us little or nothing -one and the same family may contain highlygifted, normal as well as psychotic members.
Attempts have been made to identify social causes for a number of psychiatric disorders but the problem has proved to be complex in the extreme. Causes and consequences are difficult to disentangle and social variables are found enmeshed within a network of other factors.
Psychiatrists have a duty to discover and make known the conditions under which people thrive and those under which they break down. But at the present time it would be almost impossible to specify what social changes should be instituted beyond the mitigation of poverty and severe emotional deprivation. And even here the effects as far as mental disorder is concerned are impossible to predict with confidence.
We are told that establishing clinics and appointing doctors to them is a futile displacement activity which diverts attention from the real sources of stress. Psychiatrists may reply by asking what changes in which social institutions would diminish the prevalence of schizophrenia, anxiety states, geriatric mental disorders, delinquency or violence?
The social determinists often point an accusing finger at parents who are inculpated as part of the conspiracy whereby the 'establishment' programs the control of deviants and denies them their rights, claims and liberties. This has some interesting implications -the parents' attitude was presumably shaped in turn by their parents, and so by an infinite regress we arrive at Adam and original sin. The pronouncement in Deuteronomythat the sins of the 348 CANADIAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION JOURNAL Vol. 17, No.5 father shall be visited upon the children even unto the third and fourth generation -is given new meaning.
It is not altogether unexpected that punishment enters by the back door. Szasz considers that the denial of free access to narcotic and other drugs is an unjustified infringement of the liberty of the subject. But when the heroin addict commits an offence he would like to see even more severe punishment ordered than in the case of a non-addict offender. In such arguments we are invited to adopt diametrically opposite viewpoints according to whether it is society or the person with emotional disorder that comes under consideration.
Though stated in more cogent form, the views expressed by Baroness Wootton on related matters exhibit a similar inconsistency. When the individual is psychotic, obsessed, alcoholic or otherwise addicted, social forces should be viewed as the main determinants, and society as the culprit. On the other hand when the community arraigns an individual for irresponsible behaviour, no such deterministic arguments should be allowed to provide him with an alibi. Yet the two types of problem frequently arise in regard to one and the same person. One day he may be drinking himself into oblivion to ease the distress engendered by having to survive in a corrupt, competitive, consumer society, and the following day he may beat his wife insensible in a fit of jealousy or kill a pedestrian while driving his car in a state of frustration and rage.
The confident assertions and social panaceas of the critics of psychiatry are remote from reality. We have learned something about the social factors which contribute to certain psychiatric disorders; it is plain that generalizations which go across the board are unjustified. When specific conditions, undoubtedly due to organic factors, are omitted causation can be allocated to three broad groups of factors -the inherent tendencies, the social and other environmental forces active in different stages of the life span and also the interaction between the two. Because the degree of stress imposed by a given en-vironmental influence varies for different persons, the extent to which responsibility for causation is apportioned to these groups of variables requires painstaking research in each form of disorder.
One would hardly suspect from the writings of Laing that decades of careful enquiry have shown that the socially underprivileged status found in a high proportion of people suffering from schizophrenia is a consequence rather than a cause of the disorder; nor does he anywhere hint that research has unequivocally upheld the importance of hereditary factors. Although no one would wish to postpone obviously needed reforms and modifications of attitude until the glorious sun of science has precisely illuminated everything, diatribe and assertions unsupported by evidence are no longer acceptable as the foundation for policymaking in efforts to help those with mental disorder.
Social Progress and its Vicissitudes
It is all too easily forgotten that the effects of social measures, even those which may have been justifiably regarded as constructive and beneficent, are difficult to predict or control. Thirty years ago few could have foretold the steadily increasing rate of crime, particularly violent crime, seen since 1945 in Scandinavia, Great Britain, North America and the whole of the affluent world.
Action is urgently needed to remedy many social ills. But although men of learning and science must first acknowledge their own ignorance they should have learned that by indulging in passionate denunciations and moral censure they sacrifice what they can contribute in constructive effort. Following the end of the First World War, Thomas Hardy wrote that "After two thousand years of mass We've got as far as poison-gas."
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Criticisms of Psychiatrists
In the picture drawn by some critics the psychiatrist is depicted as one of the agents utilized by a corrupt social order to perpetuate and extend its influence. The argument bears similarity to that which Newman had to meet in the last century: "Dr. Newman teaches that truth is no virtue: his denials that he teaches this are not to be credited since they come from a man who teaches that truth is no virtue." The psychiatrist is accused of equating maladjustment with illness. But ill people may be socially well-adjusted during most of their lives and some are highly successful -and the reverse is equally true. The trained psychiatrist will rarely be so jejune as to make a psychiatric diagnosis on the basis of maladjustment alone, for this may be a consequential or unimportant feature. He is suspected of threatening the precious liberty of the individual to adopt any deviant conduct, whether it be drunkenness, promiscuity or a generally loosely organized life, of being the agent created by the ruling factions of society to secure conformity to its standards. Psychiatrists would defend the right of the individual to deviate and dissentbut would draw attention to the absence, in such defences of freedom, of any reference to alcoholics who kill on the road or in fits of jealousy or the damaged personality who may batter a child to insensibility or to death. Nor do the affirmations of the right to promiscuity pause to reckon the social cost of one-parent families and illegitimacy. The right of the individual to end his own life if he so chooses has recently been eloquently reasserted. But let it also be remembered that once upon a time in underdeveloped and tribal societies man's capacity to be his own executioner or willingly to give up his life was sometimes exploited for the socially sanctioned disposal of the old and weak, of offenders and dissenters who had sinned against existing mores or those who were humiliated or deposed.
Other Criticisms
It is asserted that some forms of psychiatric treatment are acts of violence. This ignores the testimony of the many studies which demonstrate the efficacy of modern methods being used to reduce the suffering of those afflicted with schizophrenia and depressive disorders. Within the living memory of many of us there were patients outside as well as within hospitals who starved themselves to death or did not speak for months on end. Many of the developments in social and community psychiatry within the past three or four decades would not have been possible without the advances achieved through physical treatments.
The point is often made that many of the great reformers, and indeed men of original genius, have been afflicted by emotional disturbance and that if we attempted to iron these out, not only would we create societies that are dreary, monotonous and stultifying, but we would remove a powerful creative force and cause our communities to stagnate. It is assumed that the neuroses and deviations of the Van Goghs, the Tchaikowskys, the Florence Nightingales, Darwins, and Baudelaires of this world were indispensable for their scientific and artistic achievements. In some cases this may have been so, and Darwin is perhaps an example. But it is just as likely that Van Gogh would have painted better if he had not drunk absinthe, and that we should have been the richer if he had not in his thirties shot himself while in a disturbed state of mind. Florence Nightingale's achievements might have been even greater had she not spent a considerable part of forty years confined to her bed and had she not ruthlessly driven and contributed to the demise of a number of gifted men, including Sydney Herbert and Arthur Hugh Clough. Psychiatric treatment might have altered her behaviour. But the view that her drive would have been weakened and her achieve-
